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NON-PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS:
TOWARD A MODEL OF COOPERATION AND
LENIENCY*
CINDY R. ALEXANDER AND YOON-HO ALEX LEE**
We apply the Kaplow-Shavell model of optimal law enforcement
to study the effects of prosecutors’ use of non-prosecution
agreements (NPAs) to obtain cooperation on broader
enforcement objectives, including deterrence of crime. The NPA
policy of the Department of Justice is documented in a series of
memos that provide guidance to federal prosecutors on the
charging of corporations. Prosecutors may offer NPAs as
alternatives to a plea agreement in exchange for the company’s
authentic cooperation. A benefit of authentic cooperation is to
reduce the prosecutors’ costs of case development, both postreferral and pre-trial. But in order for the NPA to induce
cooperation, the company must regard it as more lenient (or no
less lenient) than the plea settlement. Thus, one concern
regarding the use of a NPA is that the leniency it provides may, if
anticipated, undermine general deterrence. For this reason, the
prosecutor who seeks to maximize general deterrence may be
more cautious in offering NPAs than one who is primarily
concerned about minimizing the use of federal resources. A
closer look at the tradeoffs reveals strategic benefits of the use of
NPAs beyond the resource savings from cooperation. Using our
basic model application as a guide, we conclude that the policy of
limiting the use of NPAs to cases where the company provides
authentic cooperation serves several enforcement objectives.
From a traditional social welfare perspective, the efficiency of the
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NPA relative to a plea depends on whether the value of the
resources saved through cooperation—in the form of increased
ex ante probability of sanction faced by the offender—exceed the
direct loss of deterrence due to the leniency of the sanction
needed to obtain cooperation under the policy, other things
equal. We also conclude that the use of NPAs—with or without
cooperation—can facilitate efficient substitution between the
informal sanctions that attach to criminal conviction, which can
be socially costly (a deadweight loss), and the monetary sanction
(a transfer). We suggest extensions of the model in which the
effect of the NPA is to facilitate substitution into more efficient
forms of settlement than those that would occur through plea
agreements alone.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1994, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance (“John Hancock”)
settled charges that it had “repeatedly violat[ed] Massachusetts state
law by giving legislators gifts worth more than $50,” such as theater
and sports tickets and, in one instance, an expense-paid trip to the
Super Bowl.1 After a lengthy investigation, the federal government
entered into a non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”) with the
company in which it admitted to violations of the state criminal law,
“paid a substantial fine, and implemented structural, management
and policy changes to prevent the recurrence of the matters under
investigation.”2 “[T]he government [also] levied a $1.01 million fine
against John Hancock, [and] mandated that [it] implement a more
stringent corporate compliance policy, fire or reassign[] two
employees . . . , and continue[] to cooperate.”3 In other words, the
government and John Hancock had a formal agreement, not filed
with or supervised by any court, which stipulated that the government
would drop the charge in exchange for John Hancock’s ongoing
cooperation and acceptance of the terms of settlement. Although it
may have been costly for John Hancock to fulfill the terms of the
agreement, at the end of the day, it avoided having to plead guilty to
the charges and avoided further sanctions and adverse consequences.
The government, on the other hand, was able to avoid the
expenditure of resources needed to convince John Hancock to enter a
guilty plea.
What happened between the government and John Hancock is
an early example of the growing numbers of agreements that have

1. Ralph F. Hall, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, in
PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIME: LEGAL PENALTIES FOR CRIMINAL & REGULATORY
VIOLATIONS 119, 129 (James T. O’Reilly et al. eds., 2009); see John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 1994 Rulings 646 (Mass. State Ethics Comm’n 1994), https://www.mass.gov/files
/documents/2017/11/15/1994%20State%20Ethics%20Commission%20Rulings%20final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AG2Y-B7B6]. The Chief of the Criminal Division of the United States
Attorney’s Office noted that Hancock paid the same level of penalty it would have paid
under a criminal prosecution, that Hancock’s exceptional cooperation was a factor in the
decision to enter into the civil agreement rather than pursue a criminal charge, and that
the agreement did not prevent prosecution of employees for the misconduct. See John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company Enters Into Civil Settlement, Announces U.S.
Attorney, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 22, 1994, Infotrac Newsstand, p0322NE009. NPAs were
also entered into with Salomon Brothers in 1992 and with Sequa and Aetna in 1993. Hall,
supra, at 128–31.
2. Id. at 129 (internal citation omitted).
3. Id.
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since taken place between federal prosecutors and corporations that
are suspected of committing misconduct. A NPA is an agreement
between the prosecutor and the company, without any direct judicial
supervision, in which the prosecutor agrees not to prosecute in return
for cooperation and other concessions.4 In some instances, an
agreement between the prosecutor and the company may take the
form of a deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”). A DPA is filed
with a court; the prosecutor offers to defer any prosecution until a
certain date and to drop the case if the company fulfills some
obligations by that date.5 Such was the case with Prudential Securities,
which settled with the U.S. Attorney in Manhattan through a DPA in
1994.6 Because neither the NPA nor the DPA entails the corporate
defendant pleading guilty, we refer to them as non-plea settlements.
The prosecutor’s growing use of non-plea settlements raises a
number of questions as a matter of law and policy. This Article
sidesteps the legal questions and seeks to examine the practice from a
policy perspective using an economic approach. For example, what
would motivate the prosecutor to seek a NPA as opposed to a plea?
What tradeoffs would the prosecutor face in choosing between
traditional and alternative forms of settlement? Should the public be
concerned that the practice of non-plea settlements may undermine
the deterrent effect of enforcement and thereby lead to more crimes?
How might the prosecutor’s choice affect social welfare? To answer
these questions, this Article considers the parties’ incentives in
reaching this type of non-plea criminal settlement and considers the
benefits and costs the prosecutor may face. Our understanding of
non-plea settlements and their operation derives from a series of
memoranda issued by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), which
provide prosecutors with specific guidance in bringing criminal

4. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal
Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea
Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 545 (2015)
5. Id.
6. See Kurt Eichenwald, Brokerage Firm Admits Crimes in Energy Deals, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/28/us/brokerage-firm-admitscrimes-in-energy-deals.html?pagewanted=all
[https://perma.cc/JX33-SCTG
(dark
archive)] (noting that Prudential Securities admitted to wrongdoing and cooperated with
investigators, the U.S. Attorney in Manhattan was confident the government could have
obtained a conviction, and factors including cooperation led to a decision to resolve the
matter by deferring prosecution); Interview with Mary Jo White, Partner, Debevoise &
Plimpton LLP, New York, New York, CORP. CRIME REP. (Dec. 12, 2005),
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/interview-with-mary-jo-white-debevoise
-new-york-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/3WFD-S9ES].
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charges against corporations. We then employ a standard economic
model of settlement as a guide to the analysis.
To highlight the overall effect of having prosecutors confer
leniency in exchange for obtaining the firm’s cooperation, we
compare two extreme forms of criminal settlement—NPA versus
traditional plea. We view the role of NPA as designed primarily to
reduce prosecutors’ costs of case development—post-referral and pretrial—by way of seeking cooperation from corporate defendants. This
makes sense. A NPA can shelter the firm from costs of sanction
beyond the formal monetary sanction and thereby confer leniency
relative to what would occur under a plea, which would bring a
criminal conviction as well as other related risks to the company. The
central focus of this Article is the question of whether, and under
what conditions, the use of the NPA to obtain cooperation promotes
deterrence and achieves other distinct enforcement objectives.
Our approach is to explore the enforcement authority’s (“EA”)
incentive to allow or encourage prosecutors to rely on non-plea
settlements to close criminal investigations of corporations across
various scenarios.7 In the simplest case, we consider a prosecutor who
is myopic and cares only about the budget. In the most nuanced
setting, we consider a prosecutor who regards today’s decisions as a
signal of tomorrow’s policy, bringing both the budget and intangible
effects of the enforcement decision to the forefront. In evaluating the
practical relevance of the implications of the model, we consider the
institutional setting and some of the evidence that has begun to
emerge regarding NPA versus plea settlements. We identify questions
for future empirical research.
The outline of the Article is as follows. Part I contains
institutional background and reviews the practical differences
between traditional and alternative forms of settlement. It also
introduces cooperation and discusses NPA as a form of leniency that,
when offered in exchange for cooperation, can promote the
enforcement objectives outlined in the series of memoranda issued by
the DOJ. In Parts II and III, we use a formal model to investigate the
effects of changes in the objectives of the prosecutor on the choices
that affect the form of settlement. Part IV discusses other possible
7. We use the terms “prosecutor” and “enforcement authority” interchangeably in
this Article except when referring to decisions that necessarily commit resources beyond
the disposition of an individual case and would be made at the level of the Department of
Justice or government (enforcement authority) rather than, for example, the Assistant
U.S. Attorney (prosecutor). We recognize, however, that the locus of authority is not
always clear-cut and can vary depending on the resource question or the case being
resolved.
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effects of the use of NPAs, as alternatives to plea agreements. Part V
concludes. The Appendix includes technical proofs.
I. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Debate over best practices for penalizing corporations for
criminal misconduct dates back more than a century. In New York
Central & Hudson River Railroad Co v. United States,8 the Supreme
Court established that corporations can be held criminally liable for
actions of their employees that occur in the scope of their
employment with at least some intent to benefit the employer.9
Because a corporation cannot go to jail and lacks a human mind, the
extension of this principle from the law governing civil liability to
criminal law has led to debate over the proper form of the sanction
that remains an active focus of legal scholars and practitioners.10 A
criminal proceeding involving a corporation is a multi-stage process
that begins with the detection of misconduct. Detection itself may be
a result of an inspection, initial inquiry, or preliminary investigation.
The case may then be referred to a prosecutor for a full investigation.
Although investigations can be undertaken by a number of different
government agencies, the DOJ has the sole authority to prosecute
offenders under federal criminal law.11 Depending on the strength
and the nature of the misconduct, other agencies can decide to seek a
civil or administrative sanction, and can refer the cases to the DOJ for
criminal prosecution. Close coordination between the DOJ and other
agencies of the government became commonplace in the investigation
of corporate criminal misconduct after the scandals of 2002.12 The
DOJ investigation of the firm may be expedited by the early
cooperation on the part of the target firm in providing facts or access
to evidence, should the firm choose to cooperate. Ultimately, the

8. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
9. Id. at 493–94 (noting public policy reasons for imposing a fine on a corporation
that profits from the action of an agent when the action is taken using authority delegated
by the corporation to the agent).
10. See Conceição Soares, Can Corporations Be Criminally Responsible?, 3 INT’L J.
HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 45, 46–50 (2013); David McCluskey, Corporate Liability: What
Exactly Does It Mean to Prove a Company ‘Guilty’?, TAYLOR WESSING (Jan. 26, 2016),
https://united-kingdom.taylorwessing.com/en/corporate-liability-what-exactly-does-it-meanto-prove-a-company-guilty [https://perma.cc/JS7X-TBC5].
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 547 (2012).
12. For example, the Corporate Fraud Task Force was established by executive order
on July 9, 2002, to facilitate coordination among prosecutors and between prosecutors and
regulators affected by the financial reporting scandals of the era. See Exec. Order No.
13,271, 67 C.F.R. § 46091 (2002), terminated by Exec. Order No. 1,351,974, 74 C.F.R.
§ 60123 (2009).
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process leads from detection to a DOJ investigation to determine
whether the facts are sufficient to support the assignment of criminal
liability and impose criminal sanction on the offending firm (and any
culpable individuals).13
After the investigation by the government, if there is insufficient
evidence to move forward with the charge, the prosecutor may
decline to prosecute. Otherwise, the process may end with a
settlement or a trial. In practice, criminal charges against public
companies are nearly always settled rather than taken to trial.14 This
is not necessarily a bad practice. Legal scholars have previously noted
the economic benefits of settling criminal charges in the case of
corporations.15 The important question is the terms of settlement and,
in particular, how they might affect would-be offenders’ incentives.
In deciding on terms of settlement, prosecutors, alongside
company
management,
exercise
conditional
discretion.
Notwithstanding the two examples mentioned in the opening
paragraphs, non-plea settlements were rare prior to 2003.16 The
standard form of settlement was a plea agreement that involved the
filing of an information or indictment, with a guilty plea and thus a
criminal conviction for the defendant company.17 In negotiating a plea
agreement, the prosecutor is constrained by the strength of the case
based on the available evidence, which affects the credibility of the
threat that a jury would rule in favor of the defendant if the case were
to go to trial.
Against this backdrop, the DOJ released a series of memoranda
to prosecutors on best practices for resolving criminal investigations
13. We use the term “inspection” to refer to the prosecutor’s act of following up on
leads and tips to determine whether it is unlawful, and we use the term “investigation” to
refer to the collection of facts about an action that the prosecutor believes to be unlawful
for the purpose of determining whether there is enough evidence to justify a criminal
sanction.
14. For example, according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s sourcebook, in 2016,
a guilty plea was entered in 97.7% of all cases sentenced under the Chapter Eight
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, with 2.3% going to trial. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2016 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at S-131 (Table 53)
(July 2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annualreports-and-sourcebooks/2016/Table53.pdf [https://perma.cc/FVW4-YCCJ].
15. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi, Case Selection, External Effects, and the
Trial/Settlement Decision, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP
17, 17–31 (David A. Anderson ed., 1996) (highlighting the efficiency gains in settling
criminal charges against corporations).
16. A study of criminal settlement agreements entered by public companies, pre-2003
versus post-2003, found only two non-plea settlements in 1997–2002 (2%); higher shares
were found after 2003, with 40 (37%) being non-plea agreements in 2003–07, and 115
(44%) entered in 2007–11. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 4, at 569.
17. Id. at 543.
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of business organizations. The series began with a 1999 memorandum
from then deputy attorney general Eric Holder (“Holder Memo”).18
This memo predates the collapse of Arthur Anderson in 200219 and
the current debate over the form of sanction. It sets forth a
framework to guide the prosecution of criminal conduct by
corporations regardless of whether the charging decision is being
made by a U.S. Attorney’s Office or in the main building of the
18. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to All Component Heads & U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against
Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo], http://www.justice.gov/criminal
/fraud/fcpa/docs/response2-appx-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8UR-EG3V]. This Memo has
been revised by subsequent Deputy Attorney Generals. See Memorandum from Mark R.
Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S.
Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008)
[hereinafter Filip Memo], http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88WG-3S57]; Memorandum from Gary G. Grindler, Acting Deputy
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys,
Additional Guidance on the Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and
Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (May 25, 2010), https://www.justice.gov
/usam/criminal-resource-manual-166-additional-guidance-use-monitors-dpas-and-npas
[https://perma.cc/5E5V-4EY4]; Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys, Waiver of
Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection (Oct. 21, 2005) [hereinafter
McCallum Memo], http://federalevidence.com/pdf/Corp_Prosec/McCallum_Memo_10_21
_05.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GDY-PPFK]; Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys,
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter
McNulty Memo], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty
_memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BAV-UQQK]; Memorandum from; Memorandum from
Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t
Components & U.S. Attorneys, Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution
Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (Mar. 7, 2008)
[hereinafter Morford Memo], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/03/20
/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6VF-3PK2]; Memorandum
from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, for Dep’t
Prosecutors, Issuance of Guidance and Summary of Actions Taken in Response to the
Report of the Department of Justice Criminal Discovery and Case Management Working
Group (Jan. 4, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/memorandum-departmentprosecutors [https://perma.cc/5NJ4-7MXB]; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson,
Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S.
Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter
Thompson
Memo],
http://federalevidence.com/pdf/Corp_Prosec
/Thompson_Memo_1-20-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM9K-PZRJ]; Memorandum from
Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to U.S. Attorneys et
al., Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates
Memo],
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download
[https://perma.cc
/9LH8-SGRQ].
19. Carrie Johnson, Arthur Andersen to be Sentenced Today, WASH. POST (Oct. 16,
2002) https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2002/10/16/arthur-andersen-to-besentenced-today/c9b6095e-36ec-48d5-962c-06a454bef645/?utm_term=.82be0da9f090
[https://perma.cc/92W7-D583].
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DOJ.20 Further, the framework applies regardless of the applicability
of the organizational sentencing guidelines of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission. As the framework has evolved, the factors serve mostly
as guidance to reflect the varying cultures and conditions of the
different departments and offices of the DOJ that may apply them.21
As we explain below, all memoranda beginning with the Holder
Memo emphasize cooperation as a consideration in the charging of
corporations.
A. Guidance for Prosecutors: Valuing Cooperation by Corporations
The recent history of public statements on best practice for
charging corporations for criminal misconduct begins with the Holder
Memo in 1999.22 The Holder Memo set forth eight factors for
prosecutors to consider in deciding whether to prosecute a case,
including the “corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its
agents.”23 It also reviews various forms of cooperation that a
corporation might offer the prosecutor. For example, “the prosecutor
may consider the company’s willingness to identify culprits within the
corporation,” “make witnesses available,” “disclose . . . results of
internal investigations” and “waive the attorney-client . . .
privilege[].”24 The prosecutor also may consider “whether the
corporation is seeking immunity for its employees and officers,”
“whether the corporation is willing to cooperate in the investigation
of culpable employees,” and, more generally, whether “the
cooperation is complete and truthful.”25
The prosecutor may, in exchange for these various forms of

20. See Holder Memo, supra note 18, at 3.
21. The cultural reach of the most recent memorandum to prosecutors is apparent in
the inclusion of divisions that prosecute cases to which the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines do not apply. Specifically, the Yates Memo is addressed not just to the division
and offices that were part of the original corporate fraud task force, but also to the
Assistant Attorneys General of the Antitrust Division and the Environmental and Natural
Resources Division. See Yates Memo, supra note 18.
22. See Holder Memo, supra note 18, at 1.
23. Id. at 3 (instructing prosecutors to consider the following eight factors: (1) “nature
and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public”; (2) “pervasiveness
of wrongdoing within the corporation”; (3) “corporation’s history of similar conduct”; (4)
“corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to
cooperate”; (5) “existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program”; (6)
“corporation’s remedial actions”; (7) “[c]ollateral consequences”; and (8) “adequacy of
non-criminal remedies”).
24. Id. at 6.
25. Id. at 12.
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cooperation, grant a corporation immunity or amnesty.26 It is in this
context that the Holder Memo refers the prosecutor to principles
under U.S. Attorney’s Manual (“USAM”) Sections 9-27.600 to .65027
that “‘permit a non-prosecution agreement in exchange for
cooperation’ when a corporation’s timely cooperation appears
necessary to the public interest and other means of obtaining the
desired cooperation are unavailable or would not be effective.”28
Thus, from the very first of the memoranda regarding Department
policy on the charging of corporations, prosecutors are advised on the
use of NPAs in exchange for cooperation.
Four years later, then deputy attorney general Larry D.
Thompson issued another memorandum (“Thompson Memo”).29 The
Thompson Memo places a greater emphasis on the “authenticity” of a
corporation’s cooperation when considering leniency and encourages
the use of alternative resolutions to seek greater cooperation from
corporate defendants.30 The Thompson Memo refers to offers of
“pretrial diversion” in addition to amnesty in exchange for
cooperation.31 As before, the prosecutor is referred to the general
principles governing NPAs, citing the USAM.32 The Thompson
26. See id. at 6.
27. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, §§ 9-27.600 to .650 (2017)
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution [https://perma.cc
/VH2T-FRHT].
28. See Holder Memo, supra note 18, at 6 (emphasis added).
29. See Thompson Memo, supra note 18.
30. See id. at 1 (“The main focus of the revisions [set forth in this memorandum] is
increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation.”).
The Thompson Memo introduces a new “factor to be considered” in charging a
corporation, specifically, “the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for
the corporation’s malfeasance.” Id. at 3; see also Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur,
Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory
and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1103 (2006) (“In conducting a Thompson Memo
analysis, prosecutors examine where a company’s response to a government investigation
falls on a continuum between genuinely assisting the government and affirmatively
impeding it.”).
31. See Thompson Memo, supra note 18, at 5–6.
32. See id. at 6 (“[P]rosecutors should refer to the principles governing nonprosecution agreements generally.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27, at
§ 9-27.600. These principles permit a non-prosecution agreement in exchange for
cooperation when a corporation’s “timely cooperation appears to be necessary to the
public interest and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are unavailable or
would not be effective.” As Professor David M. Uhlmann points out, this language is
similar to that of the Holder Memo except that it introduces “pretrial diversion” as an
alternative to immunity or amnesty in obtaining cooperation. See David M. Uhlmann,
Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1311 (2013) (discussing how the Thompson
Memo introduced “pretrial diversion” for corporations and led to the widespread use of
non-prosecution agreements for corporations).
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Memo might appear to constrain the use of NPAs by introducing a
requirement that they may only be entered into with the approval of
each affected district or the appropriate Department official.33 Yet we
suggest that the approval process could alternatively facilitate the
development of standards within the divisions and offices of the
Department regarding the use of NPAs. Indeed, following the
Thompson Memo’s release, the use of NPAs soon became
widespread.34 Consistent with the increased emphasis on cooperation
from the corporation in resolving criminal investigations of alleged
misconduct in this era, the McCallum Memo on October 21, 2005
requires heads of Department components and U.S. Attorneys to
establish written-waiver review processes.35
In 2006, then deputy attorney general Paul J. McNulty issued a
memorandum (“McNulty Memo”) that makes it mandatory for
prosecutors to consider the factors that had been offered as guidance
in considering whether to prosecute corporations, while allowing for
judgment by prosecutors in the weighing of those factors.36 As
experience using non-plea settlement agreements grew, guidance
became more specialized and focused. The McNulty Memo and its
successors addressed questions about the form of cooperation and
what the prosecutor was getting in exchange for non-plea settlements,
accordingly. The McNulty Memo specifically concerns the use of
waivers as a channel for obtaining information from within the firm.37
It sets forth principles for the prosecutor to consider in determining
whether to request waivers of attorney-client and work product
privileges as well as how the company’s response to a waiver request
should affect the severity or leniency of any settlement.38 Throughout
the memo, the role of the waiver is to expedite the investigation of
the corporation and the identification of culpable individuals within
the corporation prior to settlement.39
In each instance, the objective of cooperation in exchange for
non-prosecution of the corporation is to expedite the investigation of
the corporation leading to settlement. Yet a critical part of the
investigation of corporate crime from the perspective of both the
prosecutor and the corporation is the discovery of the cause so that it
may be corrected to avoid a harmful future recurrence of the
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See Thompson Memo, supra note 18, at 6.
See, e.g., Alexander & Cohen, supra note 4, at 567 fig.2.
See McCallum Memo, supra note 18, at 1.
See McNulty Memo, supra note 18, at 4.
See id. at 8–11 (discussing the use of waivers to obtain critical information).
See id.
See id.
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misconduct. Consistent with this objective, settlement agreements
often contain provisions that commit the company to reforms,
depending on the type of misconduct.40 Some of the reforms are
mandates to facilitate a commitment by the firm to better internal
policing.41 In 2008, then acting attorney general Craig S. Morford
issued a memorandum (“Morford Memo”) to address the use of
monitors and to explain their role in monitoring and assessing
corporate compliance with agreement terms that are designed to
reduce the risk of a repeat offense.42 Unlike previous guidance on the
decision to charge a corporation, the Morford Memo highlights the
role of cooperation in making it easier for the prosecutor to obtain
information about the quality of the corporation’s compliance postsettlement.43
Later that year, then deputy attorney general Mark Filip issued a
memorandum (“Filip Memo”) providing further clarification on the
use of “cooperation” as a mitigating factor.44 Prosecutors were
specifically instructed to assess whether corporate defendants
disclosed “relevant facts” for prosecution.45 In doing so, the Filip
Memo can be seen as calling for greater attention to the substantive
impact of the cooperation offered in exchange for a non-plea
settlement of a corporate criminal investigation.
In 2015, then deputy attorney general Sally Quillian Yates issued
a memorandum (“Yates Memo”) providing the most recent
refinement to the Department’s guidance.46 While the Filip Memo
may have confirmed that there was no requirement for cooperation in
the form of waivers,47 the Yates Memo requires that no weight be
assigned to cooperation as a factor in charging the corporation unless
the corporation has identified all individuals of the company that
were involved in the offense and all facts related to their involvement

40. See, e.g., Alexander & Cohen, supra note 4, at 589 tbl.13.
41. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation
Through Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 353 (2017) (finding that traditional
liability regimes should be supplemented by mandates when a firm struggles with
significant policing agency).
42. See Morford Memo, supra note 18.
43. See id. at 5–6 (discussing the scope of monitor’s duties).
44. See Filip Memo, supra note 18.
45. Id. at 9–13.
46. See Yates Memo, supra note 18, at 1.
47. See Filip Memo, supra note 18, at 8 (“[W]aiving the attorney-client and work
product protections has never been a prerequisite under the Department’s prosecution
guidelines for a corporation to be viewed as cooperative.”).
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in the offense.48 In principle, the effect is to discourage partial
cooperation and encourage full cooperation. Thus, companies that
find it worthwhile to cooperate fully but would otherwise have
cooperated only partly will provide more information to prosecutors
under the memo than otherwise. For other companies, the incentive is
to provide less cooperation. The intent of the memo is to eliminate
obstacles to the assignment of criminal liability on individuals within
the corporation and not just on the corporation itself as an
investigative outcome.49
As this series of memos indicates, the DOJ has long recognized
the policy of offering a NPA as a form of leniency in exchange for
cooperation as part of best practice. Although the policy on the form
of cooperation has varied over time, the objective in each instance is
to expedite the investigation of the corporation and the identification
of culpable individuals within the corporation. The company may
report the offense in advance of its detection by the EA (selfreporting).50 Alternatively, the company may cooperate by
eliminating obstacles that the prosecutor might otherwise face in
collecting facts about an already-detected offense, such as by allowing
access to witnesses or work product, as opposed to impeding “the
quick and effective exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing
under investigation.”51 Further, the company may aid the prosecutor
in collecting facts about a known offense, such as by taking steps to
identify the culprits within the corporation and by conducting an
internal investigation of the alleged misconduct and disclosing the
results to the prosecutor.52 Finally, the corporation may accept terms
of settlement that eliminate opportunities to engage in future
misconduct or, of importance to the prosecutor, remove obstacles to
the future investigation of the corporation should the misconduct
recur.53 In this Article, we focus on the use of leniency to eliminate
obstacles to the collection of facts about an already-detected offense.
48. See Yates Memo, supra note 18, at 3 (“To be eligible for any cooperation credit,
corporations must provide to the Department all relevant facts about the individuals
involved in corporate misconduct.”).
49. See id. at 2 (discussing the challenges of identifying culpable individuals).
50. See, e.g., Thompson Memo, supra note 18, at 6 (“Some agencies . . . have formal
voluntary disclosure programs in which self-reporting, coupled with remediation and
additional criteria, may qualify the corporation for amnesty or a reduced sanction. Even in
the absence of a formal program, prosecutors may consider a corporation’s timely and
voluntary disclosure . . . .”).
51. Id. at 1.
52. Id. at 5.
53. See Morford Memo, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing the monitor’s activities postsettlement may include reporting to the government on the corporation’s compliance).
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Non-Plea Settlements as Instruments for Obtaining Cooperation

As mentioned in the Introduction, the DPA and NPA are two
novel forms of settlement that have arisen after the release of
guidance to prosecutors regarding cooperation by corporations.54 The
corporation in each instance avoids a plea agreement and thus felony
criminal conviction in a court proceeding.55 It does not avoid
admitting to the wrongful conduct nor the payment of a monetary
sanction and other costs of settlement, however.56 If, at the end of the
term of the agreement, the corporation has followed through on its
obligations, the prosecutor will dismiss the charges.57 Under both
DPAs and NPAs, the company is released from the obligations of the
agreement after a specified period of time.58 The company may face a
lesser risk of costly collateral effects of the sanction, such as
delicensing or debarment, under either of these forms of settlement
than it faces under a plea agreement with a criminal conviction.59
The difference is that, with a NPA, there are no formal charges
and there is no court filing of the settlement.60 There is no obvious
channel through which third parties would obtain a copy of the
agreement. Whether the agreement becomes public depends on the
prosecutor and the company; there is no direct role for the federal
courts in the approval or enforcement of a NPA. The absence of a
court filing might thus limit the publicness of a NPA relative to a
54. Rachel Delaney, Congressional Legislation: The Next Step for Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 875, 878 (2009).
55. See Morford Memo, supra note 18, at 1 n.2 (explaining the difference between
NPA and DPA and noting that the terms have often been “used loosely by prosecutors,
defense counsel, courts, and commenters”).
56. Delaney, supra note 54, at 878 (“In a DPA, ‘the prosecutor files a criminal charge
against a company, but agrees not to prosecute the claim so long as the entity complies
with the terms of a deferral agreement.’ In an NPA, no charges are filed at the outset but
may be filed later if the corporation does not fulfill the terms of the agreement.”).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Biomet Orthopedics, Inc., No. 07-8133, 2007 WL
2964201, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2007) (noting Exhibit A, which defines a period of
eighteen months for the DPA to remain in effect).
59. Cindy R. Alexander & Jennifer Arlen, Does Conviction Matter? The Reputational
and Collateral Effects of Corporate Crime 42–54 (N.Y.U. Law & Economics Research
Paper No. 17-34, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3037054
[https://perma.cc/7463-H2R7] (comparing the risks of costly collateral sanctions, such as
debarment or delicensing under a plea agreement versus a DPA).
60. See Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45, 56 n.62 (2006) (“On occasion, it is difficult to determine if an
‘agreement’ is a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement. . . . [In] nonprosecution agreements, no charges were filed or pending against Prudential.”).
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DPA. To be sure, for a company with public investors, the absence of
a court filing may not be sufficient to prevent the settlement from
being public, regardless of whether it is a NPA or a DPA.61
For these reasons, companies that value non-plea settlement as a
means of limiting the cost of the criminal sanction will either be
indifferent between NPA and DPA or prefer the NPA form of
settlement for its potential for increased privacy and absence of
formal charges. Accordingly, we focus on the hypothetical choice by a
prosecutor between an offer of a NPA settlement and a plea
agreement and consider the effect of using one versus the other on
the achievement of various enforcement objectives.
II. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF NON-PLEA SETTLEMENT WITH
COOPERATION
In this Part, we introduce an economic model of settlement that
we adapt from the prior literature and use it as a guide to analyze the
effects of relying on NPAs versus plea agreements. The difference
between the two forms of settlement in the model is that, with a NPA,
the firm faces a formal sanction and an obligation to cooperate, while,
in a plea agreement, the firm faces a formal sanction and an informal
sanction. We assume that the enforcement policy is transparent to
each potential offender. Thus, prior to committing an offense, each
can anticipate the probability of detection, the sanction if detected,
and the alternative forms of sanction that the prosecutor may offer,
including any reward for cooperation that might be offered as part of
the offer of a NPA settlement (if there is one).
Our model of non-plea settlement incorporates cooperation and
shares features with Kaplow and Shavell’s canonical model of optimal
law enforcement with self-reporting.62 In their model, the prosecutor
conserves enforcement resources by offering violators a lenient
sanction equal to the expected sanction that they would face
otherwise in exchange for self-reporting and all offenders self-report

61. Given that the company would have discretion over the release of the information
in a NPA, the publicness of the company may be a factor in determining whether a NPA
settlement is public. The regulatory status of the company also could be a factor. Thus, a
prosecutor might plausibly enter into a private NPA settlement with a private company
that has no regulatory requirement to release the contents of the settlement agreement to
the public. This is the extreme case where the risk of costly reputational effects of
settlement would be lower under a NPA than under a plea, even with other things equal
(such as the crime, the severity, and the company characteristics).
62. See Louis Kaplow & Steve Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting
of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583, 587–90 (1994).
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as a result.63 We think an analogy between self-reporting and
cooperation provides a good starting point for understanding NPAs:
each can lower the cost to the prosecutor of reaching a resolution of
an offense. Following Kaplow and Shavell, we focus on a given
offense and evaluate the effects of allowing all caught firms to
cooperate and thus become eligible for the offer of leniency, here, in
the form of a NPA. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
model to explore the effects of non-plea settlement.64
In our model, the DOJ or other EA publicly announces a policy
with respect to cooperating corporate defendants, and firms react in
ways that affect the frequency of crime. By changing the policy, the
EA can accordingly change the amount of crime that occurs. We
begin by describing the basic enforcement program in which the
prosecutor is limited to choosing between plea and trial for those
cases he does not decline. We then introduce an alternative
enforcement program that allows the prosecutor to offer a NPA that
confers some leniency (including avoiding conviction) in exchange for
cooperation (lower cost of investigation) as an alternative to a plea
agreement.
A. Basic Enforcement Program
We begin with the scenario in which a firm engages in an act that
exposes it to criminal liability and the prosecutor has decided to bring
the case. The prosecutor can do one of the following: seek a plea
settlement or go to trial. In the event the prosecutor seeks a plea
settlement, the firm would face the cost of a certain criminal
conviction. The company can reject a plea offer, however, and choose
to go to trial. Whether it is desirable to do so will depend on the
probability that the company will be convicted at trial.
Formally, we assume that each company may commit a single
type of crime that in each instance results in a harm to society of
0. The size of the entire group of companies is normalized to
mass 1. The enforcement policy and the prosecutor’s actions
administering the policy are assumed to be public knowledge among

63. To be sure, there are differences, too. Self-reporting helps conserve on inspection
costs, whereas cooperation helps conserve on investigation costs.
64. In an independent effort, Murat C. Mungan has recently developed a model of
non-plea settlement that explores the effect of privacy of the settlement on the cost of
reputational damage to the firm. See Murat C. Mungan, Optimal Non-Prosecution
Agreements and the Reputational Effects of Convictions 4–15 (George Mason Law &
Economics Research Paper No. 17-40, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=3041967 [https://perma.cc/LDC8-YEVZ].
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potential offenders. We think this is a reasonable assumption in the
case of corporate crimes, given the publicness of the DOJ
enforcement policy (e.g., the USAM, speeches, and settlement press
releases).65
The prosecutor sets the formal sanction in the plea agreement at
a level ϕ 0 that reflects the firm’s willingness to pay.66 This depends
on the prosecutor’s bargaining position. The prosecutor’s bargaining
position will depend on how likely it is that the company will be
convicted if the case were to go trial (which we denote by a fixed
probability p) and on the amount of formal sanction (which we
0) and any informal sanctions that the company might
denote by s
face as a result of a criminal conviction at trial. In this basic scenario,
we assume that the informal sanctions are the same regardless
whether the company is convicted through a plea agreement or at
trial. That is, informal sanctions in this scenario arise entirely from the
company having a criminal conviction. We have in mind the costs of
unavoidable collateral effects of the conviction that include the risk of
current or future debarment, delicensing, or exclusion from
government contracts. This can be accompanied by a cost of
0 denote the cost
reputational damage in some instances. We let s
of the collateral effects of the sanction that arises from the criminal
conviction, whether through a plea agreement or at trial, and is absent
otherwise. In summary, the caught company is confronted with the
choice between a certain sanction of ϕ s with a plea agreement
and the expected sanction of p ∙ s
s if the case proceeds to trial.
Deterrence depends on the probability of a sanction, conditional
on the occurrence of an offense (represented by probability, ρ). In
general, ρ will be determined by a number of other probabilities.
Specifically, it will be the product of (i) q , the probability that
misconduct will get reported (e.g., by tippers, whistleblowers, or
witnesses), (ii) q , the probability with which the prosecutor will
inspect or follow up on the leads it receives, and (iii) q , the
65. In the model, potential offenders must be aware of the enforcement policy in
order for it to have an effect on general deterrence. Cf. Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary,
Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 5 (2017).
66. The public release of DOJ guidance on the corporate charging decision enhances
transparency and thereby affects the conduct of the prosecutor and the corporations who
are, or may be, subject to criminal investigations. See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K.
Hur, The Power of the Corporate Charging Decision over Corporate Conduct, 116 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 306 (2007) (suggesting that the Thompson and McNulty Memos built
transparency into the prosecutors’ deliberative process and thus increased the “fairness,
discipline, and consistency of that process by forcing decision-makers to justify
discrepancies more rationally and persuasively”).
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probability with which the prosecutor will decide to conduct a full
investigation upon following up on a lead. We observe two points
regarding ρ q q q .67 First, this is the ex ante probability of
sanction the offender faces upon committing a misconduct. Second,
although q is assumed to be exogenously determined and fixed, the
EA (and thus the prosecutor) is assumed to exercise some control
over ρ, implicitly by deciding how much time and effort to spend in
following up on referrals and leads (i.e., by affecting q and q ). The
EA is assumed to have no control over p, s or s (probabilities of
conviction at trial as well as formal and informal sanction upon
conviction), which are set as a matter of law, policy, and other factors
that lie outside the prosecutor’s discretion in this context. Inspection
(or alternatively, following up on leads) is assumed to be costly (i.e.,
0), and we assume c
is large enough that EA cannot
c
simply set q equal to 1 but faces a constraint in choosing q . Because
the EA also must allocate resources to investigate detected offenses
and build cases, we will consider the allocation of resources between
inspection efforts and investigation efforts.
Following Becker,68 we assume that each company commits a
crime if the expected private benefit exceeds the expected private
cost from the company’s perspective. That is, if company i expects to
by engaging in an activity (while causing
reap a private benefit of
society a harm of ℎ) and the expected cost is
, then it will
commit the crime if the benefit exceeds this expected sanction
). To introduce heterogeneity of firms,
amount (i.e., if
is a random
we assume that for each firm the private benefit
variable distributed according to a probability density function, ∙ ,
which has support over positive real numbers. The offense frequency
thus equals the density of firms with positive net benefits from the

67. This is a departure from Kaplow & Shavell’s original set-up, which models a form
of industry-wide inspection by a government actor. Prosecutors, however, do not conduct
such general inspections; instead, they typically act upon being tipped by third parties.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 62, at 587.
68. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 176 (1968). For a more recent discussion, see Chalfin & McCrary, supra note
65, at 8. Differences in the potential offender’s expected sanction can also be obtained by
varying parameters of Becker’s model. See, e.g., Justin McCrary, Dynamic Perspectives on
Crime, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME 82, 87–96 (Bruce L. Benson et al.
eds., 2010) (considering the time preferences for marginal offenders); Edward M.
Iacobucci, On the Interaction Between Legal and Reputational Sanctions, 43 J. LEGAL
STUD. 189, 189–207 (2014) (discussing outsider beliefs about the offender’s type relative to
the non-offender). See generally Mungan, supra note 64, (considering the publicness of the
settlement).
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, where
∙ is the corresponding
offense, i.e., 1
cumulative distribution function. We assume that the magnitude of
the social harm from the offense, ℎ, is smaller than
. Finally, we
also allow for the possibility that in some instances, the private
benefit may be greater than .
Without novel forms of criminal settlement, each caught firm
faces a choice between accepting a plea and going to trial, with a
sanction under the plea agreement that is similar to, or lower than,
the expected sanction at trial. For simplicity, we assume that the
result of getting caught is a plea bargain with a formal sanction of
and
, . This is in addition to the informal sanction
69
consistent with Bar-Gill and Ayal. In this setting, the higher the
probability of conviction at trial and the formal sanction in case of a
guilty verdict, the greater the expected total sanction amount under
the plea.
B.

Alternative Enforcement Program: NPA

From the perspective of the prosecutor, the use of a NPA
rewards cooperation by the caught offender and thereby lowers the
prosecutor’s cost of the investigation needed to justify the sanction
under the existing standards of law and policy. From the perspective
of each firm, the NPA can potentially confer greater leniency than
under a plea offer net of any cost to the firm of providing the
cooperation, which we assume to be zero.70
To explore the effects of offering leniency and obtaining
cooperation through NPA in more detail, we observe the following.
First, if the normal cost of investigation for each case is
0,
the offer of a NPA should change the prosecutor’s cost of
investigation to some lower amount
, where 0
1. The
1 captures the requirement of the guidance that
condition that
the prosecutor offers a NPA only if a firm’s cooperation is authentic,
69. See Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L.
& ECON. 353, 357 (2006). There is a rich literature examining the dynamics of strategic
bargaining. See Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78
AM. ECON. REV. 713, 713–15 (1988). We simply assume that is the equilibrium sanction
amount for accepting a plea offer (e.g., a Nash bargaining solution), and that the
prosecutor and the defendant agree that a sanction of together with an admission of
guilt is mutually beneficial.
70. In this Part, cooperation mainly consists of not putting in place obstacles that
might hinder the prosecutor’s access to facts about the offense and culpable individuals
where it is costless to the company to provide access. If obstacles are costly to put in place,
the cost of cooperating may indeed be negative.
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timely, and effective enough to reduce the prosecutor’s cost of the
investigation.71
Second, companies that are faced with a choice between a NPA
and a plea may be willing to pay a higher monetary sanction and
sustain other burdens—beyond what occurs under the plea
settlement—to obtain the NPA rather than a plea.72 This assumes that
on the leniency it obtains by
the company places a value of
entering into a NPA instead of a plea agreement.
Suppose that a prosecutor is able to impose a monetary sanction
, where 0
. From
under a NPA settlement in the amount of
the perspective of an offending firm, the expected cost of a NPA is
. Unlike , we do not require that
1. That is, we
simply
reserve the possibility that the monetary sanction levied under a NPA
may be equal to, or even higher than, one levied under a plea for the
same offense.
and
may vary from one case to
Note that in practice
another. In this model, since we are dealing with a given type of
offense and cooperation for which the DOJ’s guidance applies, we
assume they are both fixed and exogenously determined, and the
prosecutor’s choice is allowed to reflect the comparison of the payoffs
from NPA and plea.
This leads us to describe the leniency that arises from the
substitution of a NPA for a plea agreement. Consider first the case
1. This indicates that regardless of whether the DOJ
where
pursues a plea or a NPA, the formal sanction (e.g., the monetary fine)
the firm would face is the same. Nevertheless, the advantage of a
NPA is that no formal conviction attaches to it, and thus, the
(e.g., the incremental costs of collateral
company does not face
effects, such as debarment, or of any reputational damage from a
criminal conviction) as above. Rather than facing the cost of a plea
, the company faces the cost of a
that includes a conviction,
NPA settlement, . Thus, the NPA is a more lenient settlement even
when the formal sanction remains unchanged between plea and NPA.

71. In the basic model, we are making a simplifying assumption that each firm
provides cooperation. Under this model, every firm can qualify for a NPA. In an extension
of the model, we could assume that, once an offense is committed, there is a
probability ∈ 0, 1 that the offending firm will be able to offer authentic cooperation.
Such a set-up would ensure that at equilibrium we observe both NPAs and plea
agreements among offending firms. In the Appendix, we establish Propositions 1 and 2
with this extension. The basic model is covered by letting
1.
72. See Mungan, supra note 64, at 1 (noting that “firms would be willing to pay an
NPA premium to avoid convictions”).
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The set-up of our model relaxes the assumption that the formal
to
sanction is the same under both regimes, however. We allow
take on values other than 1. With an adjustment to the monetary
sanction, the cost of the sanction to the company with a NPA would
as opposed to
with a plea.73 One possibility is that the
be
prosecutor can enhance the leniency offer by also lowering the
monetary sanction in addition to relieving the offender of the burden
of a conviction. Thus, the prosecutor might impose a monetary
of what the offender would face with a
sanction that is a fraction
1.
plea where
We note that a prosecutor concerned with the possibility of
excess loss of deterrence might even choose
1. In other words, it
is possible that the firm may be offered a NPA with a higher
monetary sanction than one it would face under a plea. Such an offer
can still be consistent with the use of a NPA as a lenient alternative to
plea if the company might still prefer to avoid a conviction because it
would face a rather large informal sanction . The higher the value of
the elimination of a criminal conviction to the company, , the
greater the room for a partially offsetting increase in the monetary
sanction. Separately, for the time being, we assume the cost of
cooperation to the company is zero74 and that if
, the
company will still prefer a NPA over a plea. The NPA policies are
implementable over a wide range of monetary sanctions, subject to
∈ 0,1
. Obviously, if
,
the constraint that
then the company should prefer a plea agreement, and would never
agree to a NPA.
For this reason, in our model, we formally define leniency to
, the condition under which the company would
mean
(weakly) prefer the NPA. The value of leniency to the company is

73. Generally,
may be equal to 1, but it may also be greater than or less than 1, and
may be greater than or equal to the expected cost of collateral sanctions arising from
the conviction, such as exclusion from future dealings with the government. For example,
may be greater
if the settlement is more public under the plea than under the NPA,
than the cost of the collateral sanction by an amount equal to the cost of reputational
damage from the reactions of outsiders to the plea relative to the NPA settlement.
74. That is, we consider cooperation as an action or process that is costless to the firm
and informative to the prosecutor. Relaxing this assumption has the effect of reducing the
expected cost savings to the company from the NPA. If the cost of cooperation to the
company is high enough, the leniency value of the NPA may disappear, and the company
may end up preferring the plea agreement as a way to avoid paying not just the penalty
but also the cost of collecting the facts (or other effort required) to justify the penalty
under existing legal or policy standards. In terms of our model, if the cost to the company
0, then the firm would consider the NPA more cost-effective (or
of cooperation is
.
no less cost-effective) as long as
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greatest in the case of complete amnesty
0 and is smallest
when the company is indifferent between the NPA and plea i.e., when
.
Table 1 below lists the variables and parameters in this model.
Part III examines the choice of the prosecutor who is able to
substitute a NPA for a plea agreement to obtain cooperation, after
which we turn to the bundling of the use of a NPA with other
enforcement strategies.
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Harm to society of a single occurrence of crime
Private benefit to firm of committing the crime
Probability density function of firms’ benefits
from committing the crime
(Fixed) probability of conviction in case of trial
Ex ante probability of sanction for the offender
upon committing the crime
Probability that misconduct will get reported by
tippers, whistleblowers, or witnesses
Probability that the prosecutor will inspect or
follow up on the leads it receives
Probability that the prosecutor will decide to
conduct a full investigation upon following up on
a lead
Formal sanction specified in a plea settlement
Formal sanction in case of conviction at trial
Informal sanction in case of conviction by plea or
trial (i.e., cost of reputational or collateral effects,
such as exclusion from government dealings)
Cost of inspection for the prosecutor
Cost of investigation for the prosecutor
The prosecutor’s total budget
Cost of investigation with the firm’s cooperation
as a fraction of the cost of investigation without
any cooperation
Monetary sanction under NPA as a fraction of
the monetary sanction under a plea
Table 1: Variables and Parameters

III. APPLYING THE BASIC MODEL: PROSECUTOR CHOICE UNDER
ALTERNATIVE ENFORCEMENT OBJECTIVES
Next, we consider how the ability to offer leniency in exchange
for cooperation through a NPA affects the incentives of a prosecutor
who faces not only a single hypothetical case but a population of cases
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of a given type, each calling for the use of resources to develop the
case for trial. Whether the prosecutor would want to offer a NPA to
every offending firm depends on the enforcement objective. To
illustrate this, we consider a series of scenarios in which the
prosecutor is confronted with distinct objectives. The point is that the
number of firms that actually get leniency will depend not just on
whether use of NPA is part of the policy but also on the incentives of
the prosecutor who applies the policy.75
A. Objective #1: Conserving Enforcement Resources
As a benchmark for comparison, we consider the hypothetical
prosecutor who cares only about freeing up enforcement resources
through the more efficient resolution of criminal investigations. From
a traditional welfare perspective, the prosecutor may regard the
sanction as welfare-neutral, as it would be if it were a wealth transfer
between each firm and the government with no other consequences.
Such an objective may be difficult to sustain in practice: it would
imply that the prosecutor is excluding from consideration the longrun outcome of the settlement policy.
Nevertheless, in this scenario, the value to the prosecutor of
being able to offer non-plea settlements to all firms that provide
authentic cooperation is simply the value of the saved enforcement
resources. This is the product of the expected cost of investigating
firms whose offenses are referred to the prosecutor after being
detected, on the one hand, and the proportion of the investigation
cost saved, on the other. A prosecutor who faces an objective of
minimizing the use of resources to settle cases, and only that
objective, would thus prefer to use a NPA rather than a plea in each
instance. This is without any adjustment to the monetary sanction
1).
(i.e., with
In summary, the prosecutor can maximize the savings of
enforcement resources by offering a NPA to each company that is
willing to cooperate. This behavior is not what we observe in practice,
however. Prosecutors use a variety of forms of settlement. Thus, we
turn to other objectives that might more realistically characterize the
incentive environment of the prosecutor in choosing between NPA
and plea.
75. The incentives of the prosecutor are considered here as distinct from the objective
of the law, such as that of incapacitating the offender or deterring a future offense. See,
e.g., Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 65, at 12 (“Generally speaking, there are two
mechanisms through which criminal-justice policy reduces crime: deterrence and
incapacitation.”).
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Objective #2: Maximizing Proceeds and Resource Savings

The prosecutor may seek to increase the aggregate proceeds that
accrue from settlement while limiting the use of enforcement
resources. The assumption that prosecutors care about increasing
their aggregate proceeds is consistent with the models of plea
bargaining by Landes and Bar-Gill and Ayal.76 There are two ways to
use a NPA to obtain an increase in the aggregate settlement proceeds,
net of the enforcement resource cost.
First, the prosecutor could monetize the value that firms place on
having a NPA rather than a plea settlement. This could be done by
raising the monetary sanction imposed in the NPA above what it
would be in the plea agreement for the same offender and offense. In
1, the prosecutor would strictly prefer a NPA to
other words, if
obtain both the higher proceeds (e.g., higher revenue from fines and
to save on investigation costs.
Second, even without a higher monetary sanction, the use of a
NPA should enable the prosecutor to increase settlement proceeds in
the aggregate—by settling each case more quickly and with lesser
demand on the prosecutor’s resources. In other words, even if
1,
the prosecutor would prefer a NPA if the savings from reduced
investigation costs were sufficiently high to offset the loss in proceeds.
In summary, the NPA policy can pay off from the perspective of
both proceeds and budgetary resources. The prosecutor may increase
the monetary sanction to capture some of the gain to each firm that is
relieved of criminal conviction and also capture the resource savings
that come from the decline in case-preparation costs that is the direct
result of authentic cooperation. In practice, the prosecutor need not
raise the monetary sanction under the NPA to a higher level than
what it would be under the traditional plea regime, however. The
prosecutor could use the resources that are freed up by cooperation
to generate more settlements, and thus more settlement proceeds,
even if the monetary sanction remains the same under the NPA as in
the plea agreement. Indeed, in the case where cooperation is costly to
the offending firm, a strategy of lowering the monetary sanction as an
increased reward for cooperation could increase in the resulting
resource savings and proceeds above what occurs under the
traditional plea settlement.
All of this assumes no effect on general deterrence, as would
occur if offending firms were unable to anticipate the ability to obtain
76. See Bar Gill & Ayal, supra note 69, at 357; William M. Landes, An Economic
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61, 63–64 (1971).
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leniency through a NPA. The resource savings and increased
proceeds are entirely a result of the increased bargaining power of the
prosecutor under the NPA policy. Enforcement policies, however, are
generally designed to improve deterrence.
C.

Objective #3: Maximizing Deterrence with a Fixed Budget

Turning to the effect of the NPA policy when the objective is to
maximize general deterrence, we suppose now that the prosecutor is
interested in deterring occurrences of misconduct as much as possible.
Suppose in this hypothetical that the government controls the actions
of the prosecutor by allocating a fixed budget to cover both its
inspection costs and investigation costs. This introduces a constrained
optimization problem for the prosecutor with a solution that requires
finding the best mix of effort—here, between inspection and
investigation—to achieve the enforcement objectives. Such an
optimization problem appears to be consistent with the U.S. Attorney
Manual’s directive to “maximize the impact of federal resources on
crime.”77
To understand how the NPA influences the prosecutor’s
preferred choice when the objective is to maximize deterrence, we
need to consider how companies are likely to behave in anticipation
of the possibility of leniency. Formally, the direct effect of the NPA
on deterrence can be seen by comparing the company’s total expected
sanction under a plea regime with that under the NPA regime. If the
introduction of the NPA were to cause companies to anticipate a
lower cost of crime in the form of more lenient settlements, the effect
would be to increase the net benefit of committing a crime to the
company; deterrence would suffer accordingly.
To be more specific, recall the default condition for violation
. Here,
under the basic enforcement program:
denotes the ex ante probability of sanction faced by the offender
under the plea regime. In other words, each firm is assumed to
commit a crime when the benefit it reaps from doing so exceeds the
total expected sanction it will face in the future, which is the product
of the total sanctions it will face upon getting caught and the
77. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27, at § 9-27.300; see also Holder Memo, supra
note 18, at 11 (“Once the decision to charge is made, the same rules as govern charging
natural persons apply. These rules require ‘a faithful and honest application of the
Sentencing Guidelines’ and an ‘individualized assessment of the extent to which particular
charges fit the specific circumstances of the case, are consistent with the purposes of the
Federal criminal code, and maximize the impact of Federal resources on crime.’” (citing
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27, at § 9-27.300)).
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probability that it will be caught. This threshold condition changes in
, where
is the ex ante
case of a NPA as follows:
probability of sanction faced by the offender under the NPA regime.
Under this condition, the informal sanction, , is eliminated from the
inequality to reflect that the NPA does not result in the informal
sanctions for the company that come with a public felony conviction.
On the other hand, the formal sanction is multiplied by a factor of
to indicate that the defendant would be subject to a sanction amount
corresponding to a NPA rather than a plea.
If the probability of sanction were held constant under these two
), there would potentially be less deterrence
regimes (i.e.,
under the NPA regime: since leniency implies that
, each
firm may face a lower expected sanction under the NPA regime. This
suggests a tendency for the use of a NPA to reduce the deterrence
effect due to leniency. Nevertheless, we should not expect the
probability of sanction to be held constant. Because the NPAs are
granted only to offenders who assist in their own investigation (i.e.,
1), the prosecutor will be left with more resources to devote to
and/or
will
inspection effort or investigation of other cases (i.e.,
to be greater than
.
increase), and thus, we can expect
The effect of offering leniency to cooperating offenders is the
subject of the model that Kaplow and Shavell develop to study the
use of self-reporting to reduce costs of inspection by a government
administrator. They show how a decline in the sanction imposed on
those who self-report their violations can nonetheless improve social
welfare because the EA may conserve on resources in return, which
can be devoted to increasing inspection.78 A similar argument applies
in our model of non-plea settlement. In the absence of non-plea
settlement, the EA does not have the benefit of cooperation and thus
must bear the full investigation cost. With a NPA, the EA has the
possibility of incurring a lower cost of investigation to build her case
and thus has more resources left for inspection or for more
investigations. The effect is to increase the frequency of settlement
and thus the probability that an offender will receive a sanction.
If the prosecutor can obtain cooperation for free—in the sense of
not having to offer any leniency to achieve the lower investigation
—there is no loss in deterrence, and the use
cost (i.e., if
of non-plea settlement to obtain cooperation would have no adverse
78. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 62 at 585–97 (discussing how an enforcement
model with a self-reporting regime—in which those who report their own crimes face
reduced fines—can lead to a reduction in enforcement resources and is ultimately more
efficient).
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effects. The puzzle of whether non-plea settlement is in the social
interest emerges in the case where the prosecutor offers leniency—
—to ensure a sufficient incentive for the firm to
here,
cooperate. The answer is that since
1, the prosecutor will have
more resources to devote to detection efforts, which raises the
probability of a sanction for other offenders.
In this setting, there is always some price the prosecutor is willing
to pay to get a given amount of cooperation and in turn the ability to
settle more cases on the fixed budget. In any case, it is clear that
whatever the budget is, a prosecutor seeking to maximize deterrence
will spend it all. Thus, if the budget is fixed at
0, under the basic
program, the prosecutor will choose the inspection and investigation
frequency and so that
1

.

In the extreme alternative scenario of a prosecutor who opts to settle
all cases with cooperation under the NPA policy, he will choose
and so that
1

.

A comparison of these alternatives leads to the following result
under the assumptions of our model:
PROPOSITION 1 (NPA AND DETERRENCE UNDER A FIXED
BUDGET). Deterrence can improve by the prosecutor’s reliance
on NPAs if the increase in cases resolved is high relative to the
value to the offender of the leniency conferred. This can
happen in one of two ways. First, if the prosecutor imposes the
same amount of formal sanction under the NPA as under the
1), the NPA policy can enhance deterrence if
plea (i.e.,
the informal sanction attaching to the plea is sufficiently small.
Second, if the prosecutor can impose a different amount of
formal sanction under the NPA, then for each level of
1) and any
cooperation required by the prosecutor (
informal sanction
0, there exists a sanction sufficiently
high that deterrence can improve.
The proof is included in the Appendix. The intuition of the proof
is that when there are no informal sanctions and the formal sanctions
must remain unchanged between a NPA and a plea, the probability of
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sanction
will be greater than
since the resources saved
from cooperation can be used to increase the inspection or
investigation frequency. Therefore, the expected sanctions will be
greater under the NPA, and the result will continue to hold as long as
informal sanctions remain small. Second, suppose the prosecutor can
impose a higher sanction under a NPA than under a plea. Then if the
monetary sanction with a NPA is characterized by
arbitrarily close
to 1
/ , the company would then enjoy minimal leniency, and yet
firms would still prefer a NPA over a plea. In that case, the direct
effect of using a NPA is negligible: even without any change in , the
prosecutor can achieve nearly the same amount of deterrence with a
NPA as he can with a plea. Since a NPA is assumed to reduce
investigative costs, the prosecutor can then divert his saved resources
to increase . Thus,
will also be greater than
, and the result
is sufficiently close to 1
/ .
will continue to hold as long as
This result has implications for the design of the NPA policy. In
order to avoid the unintended consequence of a loss in general
deterrence as a result of the offer of leniency to obtain cooperation,
the prosecutor can ensure that the monetary sanction imposed under
the NPA is not too low. If the prosecutor is unable to adjust the
monetary sanction to compensate for the adverse effect of leniency
on general deterrence, the prosecutor seeking to maximize general
deterrence on a fixed budget should offer NPAs more sparingly.
Proposition 1 joins the ongoing debate regarding the overall
effect on deterrence of NPAs in those instances where NPA would
eliminate a risk of collateral sanctions and other costs that a firm
would face under a plea agreement. One view is that, by conferring
leniency, NPAs will not have the same deterrent effect as a plea
agreement. Missing from this argument is the observation that
prosecutors require authentic cooperation from offenders as a
condition for conferring leniency through a NPA. If the leniency
discount is bundled with a sufficient requirement for cooperation (or
an adjustment to the monetary sanction), the net effect of the NPA
policy is to enhance and not diminish general deterrence. This applies
even when the NPA policy leads each firm to face a lower sanction
than it would otherwise. Formally, the question of whether the NPA
diminishes or enhances general deterrence hinges not on whether s
is present or absent, but instead on whether
.
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D. Objective #4: Enforcement Resources and Social Welfare
Now consider the prosecutor’s choices in the absence of a formal
budget constraint. The prosecutor may regard cooperation as a means
of lowering the cost of the investigations that are required to justify
the collection of settlement proceeds from offending companies.
Formally, the prosecutor would solve an unconstrained optimization
problem in which the enforcement resource constraint is incorporated
into the objective function.
We consider social welfare following Kaplow and Shavell’s
formulation, in which the objective function includes the private
benefit accruing to corporate defendants from misconduct along with
the cost to the victims of the misconduct and the cost of inspection.79
One important difference is that we have informal sanctions in the
mix, which is assumed to be a net cost to society.
To summarize, we study the choice problem of the prosecutor
who has some control over the ex ante probability of sanction for the
offender, , and seeks to maximize the overall social welfare, defined
as the sum of the private benefits reaped by firms less the costs faced
firms, the harm to society incurred by the offenses, and the
prosecutor’s resource costs. The prosecutor can offer leniency (i.e.,
) in exchange for cooperation, which in turn reduces the
1). If the sanction
prosecutor’s investigation costs (i.e.,
probability that maximizes social welfare under the plea regime is
nonzero,80 we have the following result under the assumptions of our
model, which is similar to Proposition 1:
PROPOSITION 2 (NPA AND SOCIAL WELFARE). The
net social welfare can increase by the prosecutor’s
reliance on NPA if the increase in cases resolved is
high relative to the value to the offender of the
leniency conferred. This can happen in one of two
ways. First, if the prosecutor must impose the same
amount of formal sanction under the NPA as it would
1), then the use of NPA can
under the plea (i.e.,
enhance net social welfare if the informal sanction
attaching to a plea is sufficiently small. Second, if the
prosecutor can impose a different formal sanction
79. Id. at 586.
80. If the inspection cost is high, for example, it is possible for the optimal inspection
frequency to be zero. See id. (discussing the same possibility). We do not, however,
consider such a scenario to be realistic.
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under the NPA, for each level of cooperation required
1), there is a sanction
by the prosecutor (
sufficiently high that net social welfare can improve.
The proof is included in the Appendix. The basic idea is similar
is very close to 1
/ , then the adverse
to Proposition 1. When
effect of leniency on deterrence (if any) is negligible. In this case, the
NPA is socially beneficial (and preferred to a plea) simply because
even at the same detection probability, the deterrence effect will be
nearly identical, but the prosecutor in turn will save resources through
cooperation, and the NPA involves no informal sanctions. But there
is a second important effect of a NPA. Specifically, when
is close to
/ , the NPA policy effectively facilitates an efficient
1
substitution between informal sanctions (which can be net costly to
society) and a fine (which is a transfer). This way a NPA policy can
ensure that the deterrence effect remains nearly identical, but society
can avoid the cost arising from the informal sanctions. This is an
additional benefit of the NPA, apart from the budgetary resource
savings.
Meanwhile, we note that, if the NPA is bundled with a penalty
that is arbitrarily close to 0, each firm can anticipate amnesty, and
there would effectively be no deterrence effect even if the probability
is high. A plea agreement would then be the preferred choice.
IV. OTHER MOTIVATIONS FOR NPA?: THE DISCRIMINATING
PROSECUTOR WITH BUNDLING
While our objective is to examine the effect of using NPAs on
broader enforcement objectives, the series of DOJ policy statements
points to further effects of their use. In particular, the prosecutor may
bundle reform requirements and mandates into the NPA as a
condition for leniency, and offending firms may react in ways that
may have implications for the achievement of the enforcement
objective. We consider three possibilities. First, prosecutors can use
the added leniency that is possible in a NPA to settle cases that would
otherwise be declined. The effect is to extend the scope of criminal
enforcement and the frequency with which misconduct leads to a
criminal sanction. Second, prosecutors may use the added leniency to
convince the offending firm to accept provisions—such as
commitments to self-reporting or future cooperation—that increase
its expected sanction for a future offense. The prosecutor would then
face lower costs of future detection and investigation of high-risk
offenders. The effect is to improve general deterrence. Third, we note
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that the prosecutor’s use of a NPA may have the effect, in the short
term, of changing the profile of the corporation that pleads guilty to
an offense, and in the long term, of encouraging firms to invest more
fully in robust compliance programs specifically to prepare
themselves to provide authentic cooperation in the event of a criminal
investigation.
A. Use of NPA in Complex Cases to Extend the Scope of Criminal
Enforcement
One possible benefit of using NPAs is that such agreements can
enable prosecutors to resolve weaker cases—for example, complex
cases that have merit yet face a lower probability of conviction at
trial—the resolution of which would not be cost-effective under the
basic enforcement set-up. For example, in some instances, the firm
and the prosecutor may obtain facts early in an investigation that lead
both to recognize that a case has merit despite a low probability of
conviction at trial. Of course, the prosecutor can allocate more
resources to the case to improve the chance of prevailing at trial.
Ultimately, however, some such cases will be declined. But as an
alternative to declining the case, the prosecutor may offer a NPA to
obtain a timely resolution (with the cooperation of the firm) and a
smaller sanction (than under a plea agreement or at trial) in exchange
for walking away without a criminal conviction. From this
perspective, a NPA would allow the prosecutor to impose a criminal
sanction in the marginal case that would otherwise be declined. Given
the option of proposing a NPA, the same prosecutor who would not
develop a case due to its complexity might seek to build that same
case. The effect is not just to increase the number of cases that are
settled but also to expand the scope of settled cases to include cases
that would otherwise be declined.
For example, consider the following. Thus far, we have assumed
that upon being detected in a violation, each firm faces the same
probability of conviction. We relax this condition here. Suppose
that once the government catches an offender through inspection,
there are two types of cases: a case with a high probability of
, and a case with a low probability of
conviction at trial
. Assume these probabilities are
conviction at trial ( ), where
common knowledge. The idea is that even among all cases that have
merits, there may be a difference in the availability of evidence with
which to build the case. Suppose now that the parties face the
following costs. If the case goes to trial, both sides need to spend $100
in case preparation costs (e.g., attorney fees for the corporate
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defendant). If the case were to end in a guilty plea, both sides need to
spend $50. Finally, if the case were to be resolved by way of a NPA,
resolution takes place much earlier and both sides need to spend only
$12 to come to an agreement.
Under this cost assumption, suppose we have an instance of a
caught offender and the offender faces a high probability of
conviction, . The monetary sanction in case of a guilty verdict at
trial is . The expected cost of going to trial for the offender is
100. Meanwhile, if we assume the prosecutor seeks to increase
the aggregate proceeds that accrue from settlement while limiting the
use of its own resources, the expected value of going to trial for the
100. On the other hand, if both parties were to
prosecutor is
, then the
work toward getting a plea with a sanction amount of
50 and
50, which would be better
respective values are
than the trial option for both parties. In addition, the prosecutor will
50. The
find it worthwhile to seek a plea as long as
calculation, however, is different when we have a low-type offender.
If the offender faces a low probability of conviction, it may be the
case that the prosecutor, if he were restricted to a plea or a trial,
50 (either
would find neither worthwhile. Specifically, if
is low or the probability
is sufficiently low
because the sanction
or both), then the prosecutor who compares his own cost against the
gain from sanctions collected will bring neither the plea nor seek to
go to trial.
From this perspective, the policy reflected in the DOJ’s
memoranda, starting with the Holder Memo, can be seen as
(e.g., low culpability). If
encouraging the use of NPA in cases with
the prosecutor has the option of seeking a NPA, then even if
50, as long as if
12, the prosecutor will find it
. Therefore, the
worthwhile to seek that simple sanction of
assumption that a NPA can be negotiated by the prosecutor more
quickly and more easily than a plea implies that the prosecutor will be
able to resolve more cases criminally, including those cases for which
the prosecutor previously lacked any credible threat to pursue. The
effect is to increase the number of cases that are settled with a
criminal sanction as opposed to a declination. In this manner, use of
non-plea settlement can promote greater deterrence.
Consistent with this analysis, Lanny A. Breuer, a former head of
the DOJ Criminal Division, remarked as follows:
When the only tool [the prosecutors] had to use in cases of
corporate misconduct was a criminal indictment, prosecutors
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sometimes had to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. More
often, they just walked away. In the world we live in now . . .
prosecutors have much greater ability to hold companies
accountable for misconduct than we used to . . . .81
Relatedly, a recent study by Alexander and Cohen notes that there
may be systematic differences in the cases that are disposed of under
plea agreements as compared to those that are disposed of under
NPAs and DPAs. They note in particular that (1) “the average
offense scores for DPAs and NPAs are larger than that for pleas”
(that is, DPAs and NPAs generally involve more severe crimes); (2)
the base fine is higher for DPAs and NPAs, and monetary penalties
are also higher;82 and (3) “mean and median culpability scores are
markedly lower for NPAs and DPAs than for plea agreements when
averaged across all offense categories.”83 Of these, the third
observation is consistent with the analysis in this Section suggesting
that the use of NPAs (due to lowered cost of preparation) can
incentivize prosecutors to resolve cases that present low probabilities
of conviction.
B.

Use of NPA to Obtain a Commitment to Future Cooperation

Another possible use of NPAs is that such agreements can
commit the firm to reforms and mandates that give the prosecutor
easier information access post-settlement and thereby reduce the
prosecutor’s future costs of inspection and investigation. This is
different from the use of a NPA in our basic model, where the effect
is to achieve cooperation to lower the current costs of investigation.
Instead, the NPA commits the firm to what is essentially future
cooperation.
For example, note that a significant number of NPAs involve
some type of mandate, governance reform or waiver of privileges.84
81. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the
New York City Bar Association (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr
/speeches/2012/crm-speech-1209131.html [https://perma.cc/BP97-GQ3G].
82. They note, however, that there is no evidence that the total monetary sanctions
under NPAs and DPAs differ relative to the fine that would be assessed under the
Guidelines if the offender had instead settled for a plea agreement. See Alexander &
Cohen, supra note 4, at 585.
83. Id. at 576–77
84. Id. at 540–42. Reforms and mandates through a NPA can commit the firm to a
more effective regime for self-reporting than under traditional enforcement. See generally
Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994) (exploring alternatives to strict liability that may increase the
efficiency of enforcement against corporate criminal defendants); Jennifer Arlen &
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According to Alexander and Cohen, in the sample of ninety NPAs
collected between 1997 and 2011, fifty-two (58%) required training,
the same number of them required some changes in accounting or
auditing reforms, and forty-nine (54%) required compliance-related
reforms.85 Similarly, in the same sample of NPAs, eighty-three (92%)
contained a waiver of right to speedy trial and/or statute of
limitations, twenty-three (26%) a waiver of attorney-client privilege,
and twenty-two (24%) a waiver of attorney work-product privileges.86
These reform measures do not directly provide any type of tangible
evidence that can help the prosecutor build her case in the present.
Rather, they can be seen as measures that will increase the
probability of conviction and lower the cost of investigation in the
case of a future violation.
Now consider the following. Given a case in the current period
with a low probability of conviction, the prosecutor may not find it
worthwhile to seek a conviction through a plea. He may instead draft
a NPA to impose governance reforms and waiver of privileges, such
that if the offending firm were to commit a violation (again) in the
future, upon its detection, the defendant will face a high probability of
conviction (and in equilibrium a plea agreement). This indicates that,
in a repeated game, use of NPAs can bring a greater number of
detected violations within the pool of credible threat of plea bargains,
which can in turn promote deterrence.
This analysis, however, raises a question: given that corporate
defendants might see monetary sanctions and costly governance
reforms as effective substitutes, why might the prosecutor and
defendant have distinctly different preferences for one form over the
other? One response is that the parties may have divergent
expectations of the benefits of offense that may be realized in the
future.87 More specifically, the defendant and the prosecutor may
actually differ in their (current) preferences for monetary sanctions
versus governance reforms. For example, if the corporate defendant
believes that it was fortunate to get a high realization of benefit from
committing the offense in the current period, but it is unlikely that
any sizable benefit will again be realized from a future offense, it may
readily agree to governance reforms and waiver of privileges. This is

Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (analyzing a shift from strict vicarious liability to
duty-based schemes that mitigate liability for corporate criminal defendants).
85. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 4, at 588–89.
86. See id. at 586–87.
87. In other words, they may disagree about the underlying distribution of ∙ .
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because the defendant may expect that it will have no need or desire
to commit any similar violation in the future. On the other hand, if
the prosecutor believes otherwise (i.e., if the distribution of benefits is
fat-tailed in the higher end), then he may prefer the governance
reforms and waiver of privileges to levying a sanction in the current
period, which will not be very high given the low probability of
conviction the defendant faces based on the current period’s
violation.
In short, a prosecutor who regards the NPA as a means of
lowering the current costs of investigation and future costs of
detection would include governance and legal reforms as terms in the
NPA. The ability to include governance reforms to commit the
offending firm to better future compliance is unique to the
prosecution of corporations, as distinct from the prosecution of
natural persons.
Recall that in the basic model of this paper, NPAs were
considered as net substitutes for plea agreements. Alexander and
Cohen, however, find that the use of NPAs (and DPAs) is correlated
with an increase in plea agreements.88 This finding is consistent with
the notion that NPAs act as complements to plea agreements. Our
extension of the basic model, here, to a multi-period model with
differentiated case quality points to the use of NPA as a complement
to traditional plea settlement that could lead to an overall increase in
plea agreements in the long-run.
C.

Use of NPA with Selection Effects That Encourage Investment in
Compliance Programs

Finally, we note that the prosecutor’s use of a NPA may have, in
the short term, the effect of changing the profile of the corporate
offender who pleads guilty to an offense, and in the long term, the
effect of encouraging firms to invest more fully in robust compliance
programs. This is distinct from self-reporting of an undetected
offense. That is, firms may invest in compliance programs that
eliminate obstacles within the firm to providing the prosecutor with
authentic and timely cooperation, thereby qualifying for the offer of a
lenient NPA sanction, should the firm commit an offense. To
illustrate, we relax the assumption that all caught firms qualify for
leniency and consider the effect on the profile of the firms that are
caught.
Recall that, under the USAM, the prosecutor’s decision to offer
88. See id. at 541.
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a NPA depends on the authenticity of a firm’s cooperation. If we
assume that each firm can have greater leniency with the NPA, we
might expect every firm whose only other alternative is pleading
guilty to cooperate. This was indeed our assumption in Part III. But in
practice, there may be a number of different reasons as to why a firm,
caught for a violation, would choose not to cooperate with the
prosecutor. Here we note that, for a given offense and relation of the
firm to the offense, the cost (or ease) of cooperation to the offending
firm may be lower if the firm has prior experience as the target of a
criminal investigation or has otherwise prepared to be an
investigation target. A firm that has committed criminal offenses
would be familiar with the procedures of the Department of Justice
and the expectations of its prosecutors. Such a firm may know what is
required, at minimum, to obtain credit for authentic cooperation and
thus a lenient NPA. In contrast, a company caught in its first offense
would face greater uncertainty as to what forms of cooperation are
sufficiently authentic to qualify for a lenient NPA. The firm may be
complex, and the prosecutor may find it difficult to instruct the firm
on how to cooperate. Authentic cooperation may require initiative on
the part of the company. As in all regulatory compliance, the implicit
assumption here is that there is a fixed up-front cost of compliance
with the authentic-cooperation requirements of the prosecutor and
that firms in their first caught offenses face obstacles to cooperation
that other firms do not face.
For these reasons, the willingness and ability of each caught
company to offer authentic cooperation may depend on its prior level
of preparation for cooperating with the government. To be sure, guilt
can provide an incentive not to cooperate. Yet even holding the
culpability of the firm constant, it seems that a firm that is unfamiliar
with the procedures of the Department of Justice and its prosecutors
would face greater obstacles to determining how to cooperate than
another firm with a history as an investigation target. Similarly, firms
in regulated industries may be better prepared to deal with the
government and thus better able to respond to a call for cooperation.
This would make them more likely to provide the authentic
cooperation needed to be offered a NPA settlement.
An empirical implication is that—holding constant the offense
and the severity of the prospective sanction—the frequency of noncooperation may be higher among firms that have less prior
experience dealing with the Department of Justice as an investigation
target and less prior experience in dealing with government
investigators generally. In addition, we would expect the frequency of
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non-cooperation to decline over time as firms become more familiar
with the Department’s procedures and practices. In the long-run,
however, the overall effect may be that firms recognize that investing
in robust compliance programs can increase their chances of getting
offered a NPA in the event of an offense, and therefore, the
prosecutor’s selective use of NPAs (for those firms that can provide
authentic cooperation) may have the effect of encouraging the firms
to invest in compliance programs early on.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have identified efficient government
resource allocation, post-detection and pre-trial, as a beneficial
outcome of the introduction of NPAs as an alternative to plea
agreements for the purpose of obtaining cooperation from caught
firms to resolve corporate criminal investigations. We used a
model from the prior literature on enforcement to assess the
implications of more efficient investigations of caught offenders,
post-detection.
The policy of limiting the use of NPAs to cases where the
company provides authentic cooperation can serve several
enforcement objectives. First, the use of NPAs to obtain
cooperation can lead to enhanced deterrence and improved
resource allocation by lowering the cost to prosecutors of
investigating companies, post-detection and pre-trial. From a
traditional social welfare perspective, the efficiency of a NPA
relative to a plea agreement depends on whether the returns to
resources saved through cooperation—in the form of increased ex
ante probability of facing a sanction for the offender—exceed the
loss of deterrence due to the leniency of the sanction provided to
obtain cooperation under the policy, other things equal. We also
find that the use of NPAs can facilitate efficient substitution
between an informal sanction that attaches to criminal conviction
(net cost to society) and a monetary fine (a transfer). Put
differently, the elimination of a public guilty plea can transform an
inefficient informal sanction into a formal monetary sanction in
some instances.
We also identified possible extensions of the basic model that
incorporate bundling. First, the use of NPAs can be combined with
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to facilitate efficient
discrimination between cases with high versus low costs of
resolution, allowing more cases to be resolved through criminal
sanctions rather than declination. Second, the use of NPAs may be

96 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2018)

2018]

NON-PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS

897

combined with requirements for enhanced future policing to
provide for an efficient substitution between a current sanction
and the future probability of conviction. Third, the practice of
offering NPAs selectively to those offenders who can provide
authentic cooperation may in the long run have the effect of
encouraging firms to invest more in robust compliance programs.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. We prove the results of Proposition 1 for
a slightly more general case in which the fraction of the population of
caught firms that can provide authentic cooperation is assumed to be
∈ 0, 1 , which is realized for each firm after the offense is
committed. If we let
1, the result of the original model follows.
Under the basic enforcement regime in which only plea agreements
are available, the prosecutor who seeks to maximize deterrence solves
the following optimization problem:
max

subject to

,

1
.

Maximizing deterrence in this instance is equivalent to maximizing
the expected sanction. Under the basic enforcement regime, the
potential offender will commit a crime based on whether their
. Let
be the
realized benefit value is greater than
maximal deterrence achieved under this problem. Under the NPA
regime, an offender’s ex ante expected sanction is
1
. Thus, the prosecutor solves the following
optimization problem:
max

1
1

1

subject to
1

.

be the maximal expected sanction under the lenient NPA
Let
1 and
policy. To prove the first part, we show that when
1, there is ̅ 0 such that for all
∈ 0, ̅ , the prosecutor’s
objective of maximizing deterrence will improve by his use of
1 and
0. Then note that the maximands
NPA. Suppose
are identical under the two optimization problems. But
will still be higher under the NPA because
1 and therefore
1,
the prosecutor can afford to choose higher and/or . (If
then the two budget constraints will also be identical). Therefore,
0, then
. Now since
and
if
are both continuous in , it must be the case that
1
for some values of
0,
will continue to remain greater
. Let ̅ be the supremum over all such
values (for
than
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which
), and we have the first result. To prove the
1, there exists ∗
second part, we show that for each
/ such that the prosecutor’s objective of maximizing
1
∗
deterrence will improve by his use of NPA if
. Suppose
1
/ . Then
will necessarily be strictly greater than
because, again, the maximands would be identical in the two
optimization problems, but the budget constraint is more favorable
toward yielding a higher in the
case because, again,
1.
Since
is continuous in , it must be
1
the case that for some values of
1
/ ,
will continue
∗
. Let
be the infimum over all such
to remain greater than
values (for which
), and we are done. It is clear
that

∗

0. Q.E.D.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. As with Proposition 1, we prove the
results of Proposition 2 for the case in which the fraction of the
population of caught firms that can provide authentic cooperation
is assumed to be ∈ 0, 1 , which is realized after the offense is
committed. For a given inspection probability
0, define
,
≡
1
1
and
,
≡
1
1

1

.

is the value of net social welfare
Then
,
(including enforcement resource costs) under the plea regime with
and
, and
,
is the corresponding
value under the NPA regime. The set-up here is similar to Kaplow
, the first
and Shavell’s model. In the expression for
,
term (the integral term) aggregates private benefits and social
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harms of all offenses committed, the second term represents the
informal sanctions faced by firms who would get caught and thus
eventually plead guilty, and the final term represents the aggregate
resource costs of inspection and investigation. Note that the formal
sanction imposed, , is not included in this expression as a cost
q ,q ,
because it is a simple transfer. In the expression for SW
the integral term again aggregates private benefits and social
harms of all offenses committed. Note that the threshold for
under
1
committing an offense is
the NPA. The second term represents the aggregate resource costs
of inspection and investigation, where the per-offense investigation
cost is now reduced to
for the share of firms that
cooperate. Finally, there is no term involving the informal
sanction, , for firms agreeing to NPA because such informal
∗
≡
sanctions only attach to convictions. Now let
∗
,
and
≡ max ,
,
. The
max ,
proof proceeds in the similar manner as in Proposition 1. To prove
the first part, we show that when
1 and
1, there is ̅ 0
∈ 0, ̅ , the prosecutor’s objective of
such that for all
maximizing overall social welfare will improve by his use of NPA.
∗
∗
1 and
0. Then it is clear that
.
Suppose
∗
∗ ∗
be the optimal ex
This can be seen as follows. Let
,
so that
ante probability of sanction chosen for
∗
∗
∗
∗ ∗
≡
,
. By assumption
0.
Now note that in this case we necessarily have
∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

≡

,
,
≡
. This is true
since the two integral terms become identical and the resource cost
∗
, since the expressions become identical
will favor
is free of
except for , which is smaller than 1. In addition,
∗
≡
the informal sanction term. Then it follows that
∗
∗ ∗
max
,
∗
∗
and
. At this point, since both
are continuous in , it must necessarily be the case that
∗
∗
for some
0,
will continue to hold. Let ̅ be
∗
∗
),
the supremum over all such values (for which
and we have shown the first part. To prove the second part, we
1
1, there exists ∗
such
show that for each
that the prosecutor’s objective of maximizing overall social welfare
∗
. Suppose
will improve by his use of NPA if
1
/ . Then a similar argument can establish that
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is continuous in ,
. At this point, since
1
/ ,
it must necessarily be the case that for some
∗
∗
will continue to hold. Let
be the infimum over
values, and then we have a positive measure of leniency
all such
for which is welfare-improving (for all
∈
,1
/ ). This
shows the second part, and we are done. Q.E.D.
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